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Abstract
In this paper we propose definitions of funding liquidity and funding liquidity risk and 
present a simple, yet intuitive, measure of funding liquidity risk based on data from 
open market operations. Our empirical analysis uses a unique data set of 135 main 
refinancing operation auctions conducted at the ECB between June 2005 and 
December 2007. We find that our proxies for funding liquidity risk are typically stable 
and low, with occasional spikes, especially during the recent turmoil. We are also able 
to document downward spirals between funding liquidity risk and market liquidity. 
Keywords: funding liquidity, liquidity risk, bidding data, money market auctions, 
interbank markets
JEL Classification: E58, G215
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Non-technical summary 
This paper addresses an important gap in the literature as we show that funding 
liquidity risk of banks can be measured using publicly available information. This also 
allows us to assess the interactions of market liquidity and funding liquidity risk in an 
empirical way, adding to previous theoretical finding supporting downward spirals 
between both. First, we define funding liquidity and funding liquidity risk as 
measuring without a definition is difficult if not impossible.  
Funding liquidity is defined as the ability to settle obligations immediately when due. 
Consequently, a bank is illiquid if it is unable to settle obligations on time. Given this 
definition, it can be said that funding liquidity risk is driven by the possibility that, 
over a specific horizon, the bank will become unable to settle obligations when due. 
Funding liquidity is essentially a zero-one concept, i.e. a bank can either settle 
obligations, or it cannot. Funding liquidity risk, on the other hand, can take on 
infinitely many values reflecting the magnitude of risk. Moreover, funding liquidity is 
a point-in-time concept, while funding liquidity risk is forward-looking. As long as 
the bank is not in an absorbing state, both liquidity and illiquidity are possible. The 
likelihood of either depends on the time horizon considered and on the nature of the 
funding position of the bank. In this respect, concerns about the future ability to settle 
obligations or to raise cash at short notice, i.e. future funding liquidity, will impact on 
current funding liquidity risk. 
Considering the implementation of the aforementioned definitions, a more operational 
definition would be helpful. To this end, the definition of a settlement asset is 
narrowed down to central bank money, since in the vast majority of cases; the latter is 
one of the most important settlement assets from an aggregate point of view. Hence, 
the ability to settle is crucially linked to the ability to satisfy the demand for central 
bank money. Therefore, a more narrow definition of funding liquidity can be the 
ability to settle obligations with central bank money immediately when due. 
In practice, a bank is able to satisfy the demand for central bank money, and is thus 
liquid, as long as outflows of central bank money are smaller than, or equal to, 
inflows at each point in time. However, the net amount of central bank money needed 
to remain liquid is uncertain from an ex-ante perspective and depends on the 
stochastic volume of liquidity required and the stochastic prices of acquiring it. Such 
uncertainties generate funding liquidity risk. We draw on the relevant literature and 
argue that in equilibrium there is a relationship between banks’ bids and liquidity risk, 
i.e. banks submit informed bids in the OMO taking into account information about 
future liquidity needs and future prices they have to pay to obtain it from other 
sources. Moreover, the theoretical literature shows that higher funding liquidity risk 6
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implies more aggressive bidding behaviour, in an environment with frictions in 
interbank and asset markets. Although submitted bids may not perfectly reflect the 
marginal value for funding liquidity, they should provide an ordinal proxy measure of 
funding liquidity risk. 
The proposed funding liquidity risk measure takes into account information on both 
the price of liquidity (i.e. the bid rate minus the ECB policy rate or the marginal rate) 
and the volume of liquidity obtained (i.e. the volume allotted), normalised by the total 
volume of liquidity provided, in order to maintain consistency across auctions of 
differing size. Summing up this information across bids and banks gives an aggregate 
proxy of funding liquidity risk, which equals the weighted average bid rate minus the 
policy rate, i.e. variables routinely reported by the ECB when main refinancing 
operations are conducted through variable rate tenders. 
Our empirical analysis is based on a unique data set of 135 main refinancing operation 
(MRO) auctions conducted between June 2005 and December 2007 in the euro area. 
We effectively have information on the bidding schedules of each of the 877 
participating banks in the relevant auctions. Using these data we are in a position to 
construct and analyse, for the first time, a proxy for funding liquidity. We find that 
funding liquidity risk has similar properties as market liquidity risk in that it shows 
persistence at low levels with occasional spikes, particularly after the beginning of the 
turmoil in August 2007.  
We then use this proxy to investigate empirically the link between funding and market 
liquidity. Theoretical research has rationalised strong interactions between funding 
liquidity risk and market liquidity in periods of crisis. Shocks to funding liquidity can 
lead to asset sales and may depress asset prices, with dire consequences for market 
liquidity. The loop is established when lower market liquidity leads to higher margin 
calls, which increase funding liquidity risk as outflows rise. A downward liquidity 
spiral begins, as a new round of asset sales begins so that banks can remain liquid. 
Whilst the theoretical exposition is clear, and many observers consider it relevant to 
the recent turmoil, a lack of measures of funding liquidity risk has delayed empirical 
validation. Using our risk measure, it is possible to empirically support these 
interactions by looking at the inter-relationships between the proposed funding 
liquidity risk proxy measure and the ECB’s index of financial market liquidity. In so 
doing, we able to provide, for the first time, empirical evidence that there are strong 
negative interrelationships between our measure of funding liquidity risk and a 
measure for market liquidity. In this sense higher funding liquidity risk implies lower 
market liquidity.  7
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Overall our paper provides a useful contribution in the research field of liquidity not 
only because it opens up ways of further empirical research on liquidity, an area of 
research hindered by the unavailability of proxies, but also because it can be used as a 
very efficient tool for policy analysis and monitoring.   8
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1. Introduction 
Many historical episodes have highlighted the crucial role of funding liquidity for 
banking crises. The events since August 2007 have been no different. They bore all 
the hallmarks of a funding liquidity crisis as interbank markets collapsed and central 
banks around the globe had to intervene in money markets at unprecedented levels. 
Nonetheless, a concrete measure of funding liquidity risk using accessible data 
remains so far elusive. This paper addresses this gap by developing a measure based 
on banks’ bids during open market operations. Our empirical analysis uses a unique 
data set of 135 main refinancing operation auctions conducted at the ECB between 
June 2005 and October 2008. Similar to measures of market liquidity, we find that our 
proxies for funding liquidity risk are typically stable and low, with occasional spikes, 
especially during the recent turmoil. Our measure also allows us to assess the 
interactions of market liquidity and funding liquidity risk. Even though downward 
spirals between both have been a key concern for most policy makers during this and 
previous crises, we are the first to provide robust empirical evidence. 
Measurement without definition is, however, difficult if not impossible. In this paper 
we define funding liquidity as the ability to settle obligations with immediacy. 
Consequently, a bank is illiquid if it is unable to settle obligations in time. In this case 
the bank defaults, resulting in losses to shareholders and possibly depositors. Given 
this definition, it can be said that funding liquidity risk is driven by the possibility that 
over a specific horizon the bank will become unable to settle obligations with 
immediacy. In particular we show that funding liquidity risk has two components: 
future (random) in- and outflows of settlement assets such as money and future 
(random) prices of obtaining funding liquidity from different sources. In contrast to 
other definitions used by academics and practitioners we show in the first part of the 
paper that our definitions have important properties, shared by definitions of other 
risks. First, like solvency, funding liquidity is point-in- time and a binary concept as a 
bank is either able to settle obligations or not. Funding liquidity risk on the other hand 
can take infinitely many values depending on the underlying funding position of the 
bank. As any other risk, it is forward looking and measured over a specific horizon.  
Our analysis also highlights that funding liquidity is best understood as a flow 
concept, i.e. a bank is liquid as long as outflows of money are less or equal to inflows 
and the stock of money. In a modern economy many different forms of money - or 
settlement assets more broadly - exist. For our analysis we focus on the most 
important settlement asset in the economy. In the Eurosystem, but also in most other 
economies, large value payment and settlement systems rely on central bank money as 
the ultimate settlement asset (see CPSS, 2003). Hence, the ability to settle is crucially 
linked with the ability to satisfy the demand for central bank money, which banks can 9
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obtain directly from the central bank at open market operations (OMO), the interbank 
market, by selling assets or by raising costumer deposits.  
Ideally and in line with other risks, we would want to measure funding liquidity risk 
by the distribution summarising the stochastic nature of in- and outflows and random 
prices banks need to pay to obtain the necessary funds. However, this information is 
unavailable. Instead, we observe banks’ bids during open market operations. In the 
second part of the paper we draw on the relevant literature and argue that in 
equilibrium there is a relationship between banks’ bids and liquidity risk, i.e. banks 
submit informed bids in the OMO taking into account information about future 
liquidity needs and future prices it has to pay to obtain it from other sources. Based on 
the model of Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) as a basis, we argue that if there are 
frictions in interbank and asset markets, banks with higher funding liquidity risk will 
bid more aggressively, the more so the higher their funding liquidity risk. Hence, a 
higher spread indicates higher risk. This is intuitive as banks with higher funding 
liquidity risk are willing to pay a higher price to obtain funds from the central bank to 
hedge this risk. 
Our measure significantly improves on other measures used for funding liquidity risk 
so far. Banks’ own funding liquidity risk measurement such as gap analysis or stress 
testing is essentially equivalent to a very detailed analysis of the stock flow constraint 
we suggest in the first part of the paper (see Matz and Neu, 2007, or Banks, 2005). 
This is very data intensive and relies entirely on confidential information. Whilst we 
also use confidential data from the ECB, other central banks have similar data 
available. And our proposed measure of aggregate funding liquidity risk can be easily 
derived from public data provided by the ECB after each OMO. Therefore our method 
allows for a frequent and timely assessment of funding liquidity risk in an 
environment characterised by limited data availability.  
Aggregate funding liquidity risk has also been measured by the spread between 
interest rates in the interbank market and a risk free rate (e.g. see IMF, 2008). This is 
the average price for obtaining liquidity in the interbank market. In this sense it 
reflects a key component of funding liquidity risk. However, the spread is not only 
determined by the average funding liquidity risk but impacted by several other factors 
(e.g. see Michaud and Upper, 2008).  Gyntelberg and Wooldrige (2008) also show 
that during the recent turmoil the interbank market rate has become less representative 
of actual funding conditions because of increased uncertainty, dispersion in the credit 
quality across banks and greater incentives to strategically misreport funding costs.
1 
                                                 
1. Interbank rates such as LIBOR are fixed by surveying a set of banks each day about their own 
funding costs. Findings by the Wall Street Journal indicated that actual interbank interest rates have 10
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But most importantly, the spread between interest rates in the interbank market and a 
risk free rate is purely a price measure and it does not reveal anything about market 
access, which maybe severely impaired during crisis, nor the volume of net-liquidity 
demand – the second component of funding liquidity risk.   
Our empirical analysis is based on a unique data set of 135 main refinancing operation 
(MRO) auctions conducted between June 2005 and December 2007 in the euro area. 
We effectively have information on the bidding schedules of each of the 877 
participating banks in the relevant auctions. We find that our proxies have intuitive 
properties. Namely, they show persistence at low levels with occasional spikes that 
funding liquidity risk is supposed to have according to market practitioners (see Matz 
and Neu, 2007). Moreover, these properties are also shared by measures for market 
liquidity (e.g. see Amihud, 2002; Chordia et al., 2000, 2002; Pastor and Staumbaugh, 
2003). As already discussed, we are also able to show that there are strong negative 
interrelationships between our measure of funding liquidity risk and a measure for 
market liquidity. In this sense higher funding liquidity risk implies lower market 
liquidity. We are able to show that this effect is only present during the turmoil. This 
is exactly what theory (e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2007) would suggest as 
interactions should only occur once banks face funding liquidity risk.  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our 
definition of funding and funding liquidity risk. After providing a short overview of 
OMOs in the euro areas in Section 3, we analyse the sources of funding liquidity risk 
and show that higher funding liquidity risk will result in higher bids during OMOs in 
Section 4. Section 5 introduces our measures and Section 6 presents the bidding data 
on which our measures rely. In Section 7 we present the empirical measures and 
empirical evidence on their relationship with market liquidity risk. Finally, Section 8 
concludes. 
 
2. Definition of funding liquidity and funding liquidity risk
2.1. Funding liquidity and funding liquidity risk 
We define funding liquidity as the ability to settle obligations with immediacy.   
Consequently, a bank is illiquid if it is unable to settle obligations in time. In this case 
the bank defaults, and shareholders and possibly also depositors incur losses. Given 
this definition it can be said that funding liquidity risk is driven by the possibility that 
over a specific horizon the bank will become unable to settle obligations with 
                                                                                                                                            
been even higher than indicated by LIBOR during the recent turmoil. See The Wall Street Journal, 
“Bankers cast doubt on key rate amid crisis”, 16 April 2008. 11
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immediacy. In particular we show that funding liquidity risk has two components: 
future (random) in- and outflows of money and future (random) prices of obtaining 
funding liquidity from different sources.   
 It is worth to highlight important differences between funding liquidity and funding 
liquidity risk: Funding liquidity is essentially a binary concept, i.e. a bank can either 
settle obligations or it cannot. Funding liquidity risk on the other hand can take 
infinite many values as it is related to the distribution of future outcomes. Implicit in 
this distinction is also a different time horizon. Funding liquidity is associated to one 
particular point in time. Funding liquidity risk on the other hand is always forward 
looking and measured over a particular horizon.  In this respect, concerns about the 
future ability to settle obligations, i.e. future funding liquidity, will impact on current 
funding liquidity risk.  
The distinction between liquidity and liquidity risk is straightforward and similar to 
other risks. For example, a similar distinction can be made between credit risk and 
default. For example a borrower can be in default or not. Whilst default is a binary 
concept measured at one particular point in time, credit risk is not. The credit risk 
associated with a loan is determined by the likelihood that the borrower will default 
over a particular horizon.
2 Therefore, credit risk is always used as a forward looking 
measure and can take infinite many values, depending on the underlying credit 
worthiness of the borrower.  
Surprisingly a distinction in the definition of funding liquidity and funding liquidity 
risk is not made by practitioners and academics. In terms of funding liquidity, the IMF 
defines it as “the ability of a solvent institution to make agreed-upon payments in a 
timely fashion” (p. xi, IMF, 2008). This is very similar to ours, even though we argue 
that it may well be the case that an institution is liquid but solvent. Borio (2000), 
Strahan (2008) or Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007) define funding liquidity as the 
ability to raise cash at short notice either via asset sales or new borrowing. Whilst it is 
the case that banks can settle all their obligations in a timely fashion if they can raise 
cash at short notice, the reverse is not true as a bank may well be able to settle its 
obligations as long as its current stock of cash is large enough. As the ability to raise 
cash can vanish (Borio, 2000) this definition is implicitly forward looking and 
therefore closer associated to funding liquidity risk. The definition of the Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervision is close to our definition even though it mixes the 
concepts of funding liquidity and funding liquidity risk. In their view liquidity is “the 
ability to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due” and they 
argue that “within this definition is an assumption that obligations will be able be met 
                                                 
2 A broader definition of credit risk also accounts for the stochastic nature of loss given default, 
changes in the underlying credit quality and changes in exposure at default.  12
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at a ‘reasonable cost’ ” (p.2, BCBS, 2008).
3 While the first part is essentially 
equivalent to our definition of funding liquidity, the second part is in our view more 
related to funding liquidity risk even though it is unclear what ‘reasonable’ really 
means.   
Our definition raises the question how banks settle obligations. As discussed in the 
introduction, many different settlement assets exist in an economy (see CPSS, 2003). 
Generally this is not realised as for example different forms of money in one currency 
are close substitutes and can be converted into each other at par. The most visible 
money constitutes of banknotes and coins, but this only plays a minor role as 
settlement asset. On the other hand, liabilities of commercial banks – which are also 
referred to as commercial bank money – represent the largest stock of money in the 
economy. Most transactions, especially those involving private agents, are settled in 
commercial bank money. However, for banks funding liquidity risk management 
central bank money plays a crucial role as this is the one of the most, if not the most, 
important settlement asset. In the Eurosystem, but also in most other economies, large 
value payment and settlement systems rely on central bank money as the ultimate 
settlement asset (see CPSS, 2003).
4 Hence, the ability to settle is crucially linked with 
the ability to satisfy the demand for central bank money. Central bank money, in turn, 
consists mainly of deposits held by commercial banks with the central bank.
5 In 
Annex 2 the role of central bank money as a settlement asset is elaborated further.  
2.2 Funding liquidity as a stock-flow concept 
As has been pointed out by Drehmann, Elliot and Kapadia (2007) funding liquidity is 
related to flows. The authors also show that the theoretical literature on liquidity can 
be expressed as a flow constraint.
6 Given our definition, a bank is able to satisfy the 
demand for money, and hence is liquid, as long as at each point in time outflows of 
money are smaller or equal to inflows and the stock of money held by the bank. 
Following this reasoning, a stock flow constraint provides an easy and straightforward 
representation: 
  Outflowst    Inflowst  + Stock of Moneyt   (1) 
Annex 1 provides a more detailed breakdown of in- and outflows and explains in 
depth that the key settlement asset for all components is central bank money. For our 
purposes, money in constraint (1) can therefore be thought of as central bank money.  
                                                 
3 Even though it is implicit that the BCBS is defining funding liquidity it is interesting that this 
definition talks about liquidity in general.  
4 For a history of central banks’ role in interbank payment systems see Norman et al (2006).  
5 Cash and central bank reserves have also be labelled as high powered money in the monetary 
economics literature (e.g. see Friedman and Schwarz, 1963). 
6 See also Drehmann (2007). 13
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For measuring funding liquidity risk, we focus on the net volume of liquidity (i.e. 
central bank money) needed in order to avoid illiquidity. This can be represented by a 
new variable which we call the net-liquidity demand (NLD). We construct this 
variable from the stock flow constraint. Namely we take the difference between all 
outflows (Outflows) and contractual (i.e. known) inflows (Inflows
due) net of the stock 
of central bank money (M): 

















CB p A p L p L p
M Inflows Outflows NLD
t
, , , ,    d
   
 (2) 
NLD is the net amount of central bank money the bank needs to remain liquid. In case 
of a deficit (i.e. outflows are larger than inflows and the stock of money), the 
inequality highlights that NLDt  has to be financed either by new borrowing from 
depositors (
D
new L ), from the interbank market (
IB
new L ), selling assets (Asold) or accessing 
the central bank (CBnew). All these sources have different prices p. If there is a 
positive net liquidity demand which cannot be funded with new inflows, the bank will 
become illiquid and default. Conversely, if the bank has an excess supply of liquidity, 
no borrowing is necessary and the bank can sell the excess liquidity on the market.
 7   
Whilst NLDt is the funding liquidity constraint faced by the bank in each period, 
funding liquidity risk is related to future developments of NLD. For example, if 
funding liquidity risk is assessed over a one period horizon, then it could be analyzed 
by the distribution of NLDt+1. Equation 2 shows that funding liquidity risk has two 
random components: volumes and prices.  
Random volumes of NLD are the first component of funding liquidity risk. Although 
contractual obligations (whether in- or outflows) and their maturities are known, the 
possibility of defaulting counterparties can lead to some randomness. Moreover, other 
sources of outflows can be rather volatile. For example, off-balance sheet 
commitments can induce large swings in cash flows as seen during the recent crisis. 
Also note that outflows are partly endogenously determined. Indeed, under severe 
stress the bank may decide to cut back on new lending or reduce asset purchases. 
However, to ensure that franchise value is not lost, banks are generally reluctant to cut 
established credit relationships, unless absolutely necessary. Finally, some inflows are 
also endogenously and others exogenously determined. As we discuss in detail below, 
banks choose optimally from which source they want to obtain funding in case they 
face a shortfall and therefore endogenously affect inflows. Nonetheless, other inflows 
                                                 
7 Ex-post inflows always equal to outflows as long as the bank does not fail. High inflows are always 
absorbed by asset purchases or new lending, for example in the interbank market. If at the end of the 
period banks have excess inflows of central bank money they will deposit them with the marginal 
deposit facility at the central bank. 14
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are exogenous, as depositors not only withdraw but also deposit money in the bank in 
a random fashion. 
Random prices are the second component of funding liquidity risk. Ex-ante, prices of 
obtaining liquidity from different sources are, to some extent, uncertain. As we 
discuss in detail below, prices in the central bank auction and in the interbank market 
depend on the realisation of unknown shocks. The same holds for the price of 
liquidity from selling assets, especially in periods of turmoil. Nevertheless, certain 
prices are predetermined. These are the prices for customer deposits, as they are 
endogenously set by the bank. The prices for obtaining money from the central bank 
via the marginal facilities are also given.  
The question for this paper is how to measure liquidity risk given the stochastic nature 
of  NLD. Ideally and in line with other risks, we would want to measure funding 
liquidity risk by the distribution summarising the stochastic nature of in- and outflows 
and the random prices banks need to pay to obtain the necessary funds. However, 
even banks with access to far more data are unable to construct the full distribution. 
We circumvent this problem by focusing on an important liquidity source as shown in 
equation 2, e.g. central bank auctions, (CBnew) and the banks’ bids in terms of price 
and volume we observe during open market operations. While doing that, we have to 
bear in mind that in equilibrium there is a relationship between prices for liquidity in 
different markets, i.e. a bank submits informed bids in the main refinancing auctions 
(MRO), after taking into account information about its own liquidity needs and about 
the price and volume of liquidity it can get from other sources. In Section 4 below we 
show that bids, or more precisely the (adjusted) spread between the bid and the 
minimum bid rate, contain information about funding liquidity risk and can therefore 
be used as a proxy measure. There we also discuss price fluctuations in greater detail. 
However, before we discuss the theoretical background for our measure it may be 
useful to provide a more thorough discussion on the institutional background of open 
market operations in the euro area for those who are less familiar with OMOs. 
3. Open Market Operations in the euro area 
In the euro area OMOs are mainly carried out as either main financing operations 
(MROs), which are conducted weekly and have a maturity of one week or as long 
term refinancing operations (LROs), which are conducted less frequently and have a 
maturity of 3months. Additionally the ECB conducts fine tuning operations, if there is 15
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a need for an additional and extraordinary injection or absorption of central bank 
money.  
As MROs form the basis of our measure we discuss them in more detail. From March 
2005 until 7 October 2008 MROs were typically conducted as standard flexible rate 
tenders until. This means that during each MRO auction eligible banks can submit 
bids (volume and price) at up to ten different bid rates at the precision of one basis 
point (0.01%). Prices and volumes are unconstrained, except for the minimum bid 
rate, which equals the policy rate set by the Governing Council. Banks are only 
required to submit sufficient collateral for the allotted liquidity. The auction is price-
discriminating, i.e. every successful bidder has to pay her bid. At the marginal rate, 
depending on the aggregate bid schedule, bids may be rationed, so that everyone takes 
the same pro rata amount of the remaining liquidity. An example of an aggregate bid 
curve is shown in Chart A1 in the Appendix, which also shows the marginal rate and 
the total allotment for this particular auction. 
To calibrate the allotment volume in the weekly MROs, the ECB takes the sum of the 
outstanding autonomous factors (such as banknotes, government deposits and net 
foreign assets) and banks' reserve requirements.
8 The allotment volume that satisfies 
exactly these needs for central bank money in aggregate is called the "benchmark 
allotment". An ECB forecast of the autonomous factors on which basis the benchmark 
allotment is calculated is published prior to the bidding of the banks in the MRO.  
In the period since August 2007, however, the ECB followed “frontloading” practices 
in deciding the allotted volume. In order to respond to the increased demand for 
liquidity for banks and help them to fulfil their reserve requirements earlier in the 
maintenance period, the ECB allotted significant amounts over the benchmark amount 
at the beginning of the maintenance period, linearly decreasing this amount towards 
the end, always trying to maintain balanced liquidity conditions at the end of the 
maintenance period (through absorbing the extra liquidity during the maintenance 
period with FTOs). As we discuss later, this development, however, is unlikely to 
reflect on our measure, given the adjustment we included for auctions of different 
sizes.  
 
                                                 
8 In the Euro area individual banks have to fulfil reserve requirements. Banks are allowed to hold 
positive or negative (relative) reserve balances with the CB within a specified period (i.e. relative to 
their requirements banks can hold more or less. Negative current accounts, so-called intraday credit, 
have to be collateralised and will be referred to the marginal lending facility at the end of the day). 
However reserve requirements have to be fulfilled on average across the maintenance period (usually 
between 28 and 35 days). At the start of the maintenance period the reserve requirements are 
determined by the Eurosystem for each bank and remain fixed during the period. The settlement day of 
the first MRO marks the start of the maintenance period. In addition, since April 2004, this is the day 
on which interest rate decisions of the Governing Council of the ECB become effective. 16
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4. Funding liquidity risk and bidding behaviour at OMOs 
In this section we show that higher funding liquidity risk can be measured by the 
spread between the submitted bid and the minimum bid rate, by first analysing a 
stylised world where banks can only obtain liquidity from the central bank or the 
interbank market with or without frictions. In the last part of this section we broaden 
the discussion to analyse bidding behaviour when all sources of liquidity are 
considered.  
Following the seminar paper by Poole (1968), the literature has analysed a stylised 
time line focusing on the central bank and the interbank market when analysing 
bidding behaviour in open market operations. For expositional purposes we will use 
the simplest case throughout the discussion in this section shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Stylised time line 
Period 1    Primary market; Auction conducted by central bank 
Liquidity shocks 
Period 2    Secondary market; Trading in the interbank market
Period 3  Final settlement; banks can access marginal facilities at the central bank 
 
The stylised time line consists of three periods. In period 1, banks can acquire 
liquidity in the primary market by participating in the auction conducted by the central 
bank. Afterwards liquidity shocks materialise. It is important to stress that random 
volumes discussed above are nothing else than these liquidity shocks, implying 
random prices in period 2. In that period, banks trade in the interbank market. After 
interbank markets close in period 3, all obligations are settled and banks have to fulfil 
their reserve requirements set by the central bank.
9 At this point the market in 
aggregate may be short (or long) of liquidity and hence some banks may have to 
access the marginal lending (deposit) facility. Prices for the marginal facilities are 
considered key policy rates and are determined by the central bank, therefore they are 
                                                 
9 Most countries have positive reserve requirements for banks. However, theoretically it is only 
necessary that there is a threshold, e.g. zero, and banks would be penalised if their balances with the 
central bank would drop below this level.  17
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already known in period 1. At the same time, these prices constitute an upper and 
lower bound for the interest rate in the interbank market in period 2, given that a bank 
with sufficient collateral can always recourse to the standing facilities at period 3 to 
settle any liquidity imbalances. In case of the euro area, banks pay 100bp on top of 
(below) the policy rate to access the marginal lending (deposit) facility.  
At this point it is important to distinguish interbank markets with and without frictions 
as this will impact on interest rates in period 2, which in turn impact on the bids 
submitted by banks in the central bank auction – our variable of interest. 
4.1 Bidding with frictionless interbank markets 
Most theoretical models looking at bidding behaviour at open market operations 
conducted as price discriminating auctions are based on stylised set ups and rely on 
the assumption that interbank markets are frictionless and that central banks make no 
policy mistakes and always accurately provide the necessary (expected) amount of 
central bank money. For example, Välimäki (2002) and Ayuso and Repullo (2003) 
show that the optimal strategy for banks in such an environment is to only bid at the 
minimum bid rate. No bank is, therefore, willing to pay a premium above the 
minimum bid rate, in other words the spread is zero.  
This result is intuitive. First consider the case where the central bank provides the 
correct amount of aggregate liquidity and banks are only subject to idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks so that in period 2 there is no liquidity surplus or deficit. Given 
frictionless interbank markets, banks can always obtain sufficient funding in the 
secondary market, independent of the liquidity shocks they face. Hence, the interest 
rate in the interbank market equals the policy rate, which is also the minimum bid 
rate. This in turn implies that in period 1 bidding at the minimum bid rate is the only 
rational strategy and, the spread, which is our measure for funding liquidity risk, is 
therefore zero. And this is what it should be theoretically: funding liquidity risk in a 
frictionless interbank market without aggregate shocks is zero, as the bank is always 
able to settle all obligations with immediacy as it can obtain all necessary funds at a 
known and fixed interest rates from the interbank market.
10  
Aggregate liquidity shocks impact, however, on liquidity risk (see e.g. Allen and 
Gale, 2004a,b or Diamond and Rajan, 2005). Even with frictionless interbank 
markets, trading cannot eliminate the risk that the market in aggregate may be long or 
                                                 
10 This is fully in line with the theoretical literature, which has shown that with fully connected 
interbank markets idiosyncratic liquidity shocks can be eliminated and liquidity risk vanishes (see 
Allen and Gale, 2000). 18
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short of central bank money in period 3 following some aggregate shocks.
11 As prices 
for accessing the marginal facilities are fixed, the interest rates in period 2 purely 
reflect the expectations of the amount and likelihood of accessing either facility in 
period 3. However, the central bank is assumed to provide the right expected amount 
of aggregate liquidity so that the expected interest rate in the interbank market (at time 
1) equals the policy rate. Given risk neutrality, all banks therefore bid at the minimum 
bid rate and spread above the policy rate would also be zero in such a set-up.  
However, the assumption of risk neutral banks and frictionless interbank markets is 
unrealistic, particularly during times of stress. In the next section we show that if we 
relax these assumptions banks with higher liquidity risk bid more aggressively.  
4.2 Bidding with interbank market frictions 
It has been theoretically shown that asymmetric information (e.g. Flannery, 1996), co-
ordination failures (e.g. Rochet and Vives, 2002), uncertainly about future liquidity 
needs (e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole, 2001) or incomplete markets (e.g. Allen and Gale, 
2000) are all frictions which lead to funding liquidity risk. Such frictions imply that a 
bank which has to raise liquidity in the interbank market has to pay a higher price to 
obtain it. In the extreme, prices may even be infinite if a bank is credit rationed (see 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Banks, who expect to be short, will anticipate this and bid 
more aggressively during the OMO to avoid paying higher interest rates in the 
secondary market or being rationed completely.  
Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) show formally that, given frictions in the interbank 
market “short” banks (i.e. banks which do need to raise cash from the central bank or 
the interbank market to settle all obligations) will bid more aggressively than “long” 
banks (i.e. banks which have excess funds) as short banks want to avoid paying higher 
interest rates in the interbank market.
12 In particular, Nyborg and Strebulaev analyse 
the case where long banks have some market power during trading in the secondary 
market, so that they can “squeeze” short banks and demand higher interest rates. 
Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer (2008) document several banking crises where this 
                                                 
11 An aggregate shock should be thought of as a state of nature, where bank specific shocks do not add 
up to zero.  
12 Formally, the results from Nyborg and Strebulaev will only carry over to a setting with a different 
interbank market frictions, if the friction implies that long players can charge a higher interest rate if 
short banks are sufficiently illiquid. If the interbank market is closed and only banks can trade in the 
interbank market this is the case. Nyborg and Strebulaev also assume that agents have full information 
on short and long positions prior to the OMO. However, imperfections in the interbank market are 
often associated with imperfect information. Nyborg and Strebulaev and conjecture that with private 
information about positions, long players will aim to exploit their informational advantage. But in 
equilibrium short banks would still bid on average at higher rates to prevent the squeeze.  19
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effect seems to have played an important role.
13 Short banks clearly anticipate this 
when submitting their bid. They know they can avoid being squeezed if they obtain 
sufficient funds from the central bank during the OMO. It is therefore intuitive that 
banks bid very aggressively for the amount of funds necessary to avoid the squeeze. 
Nyborg and Strebulaev show that in equilibrium the threat of a squeeze induces short 
banks to submit bids above the minimum bid rate with a higher expected mean rate 
than the bids submitted by banks which are long. They also show that this price 
distortion is larger the larger the short position. Putting it in the language of our 
equation above, the higher the expected NLD, the higher p
IB, the higher the funding 
liquidity risk, and the more aggressively a bank will bid. Therefore a higher the spread 
reveals higher funding liquidity risk.  
Fecht et al. (2008) find empirical support for this theory when analysing OMOs for 
German banks. Even though they cannot observe NLD, they know a bank’s liquidity 
position with the central bank prior to the auction, relative to the reserve requirement 
set by the central bank. Using this as a proxy, they document that short banks bid 
more aggressively especially in times when the liquidity imbalance across banks is 
large. However, in contrast to our paper they do not link this to funding liquidity risk.   
Banks may also not be risk neutral, as is generally assumed, which implies that banks 
with high liquidity risk will bid more aggressively. During normal times the 
difference between bidding of risk neutral and risk averse agents may not be material, 
as interbank markets work nearly frictionless and banks can obtain any required 
amount of funding in the secondary market. The only face the risk of small price 
changes in LIBOR due to small aggregate shocks.
14 However, in stressed conditions, 
such as the recent crisis, where a banks’ inability to obtain liquidity in the secondary 
market can lead to failure, risk aversion can have significant consequences. Välimäki 
(2006) explores a model with risk averse banks, where deviations from a target level 
of central bank balances prior to trading in the interbank market are costly. Such a 
target level could for example be the result of frictions, where banks know that the 
desire to obtain large amount of funds would be penalised by rates above the market 
rate or it may even be impossible to raise the necessary amount of funds because of 
rationing. In line with Nyborg and Strebulaev, Välimäki shows that banks with a 
higher target level, or equivalently with a higher NLD  in our set-up, bid more 
                                                 
13 In the model of Archarya et al (2008) long banks take advantage of their market power to 
strategically underprovided liquidity to short banks. They profit from their failure by buying up assets 
at fire sales prices if short banks turn out to be illiquid. 
14 As long as all banks lend freely in the interbank market, aggregate liquidity shocks in the market for 
central bank money are technically only driven by changes in autonomous factors. Autonomous factors 
constitute nearly completely of banknotes, government deposits and net foreign assets. All these factors 
can and do change between frequently OMOs even though these fluctuations are generally not large. 20
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1024
March 2009
aggressively during the central bank auction and a higher spread will reveal higher 
funding liquidity risk. 
The arguments so far establish that higher bids reveal higher funding liquidity risk if 
there are frictions in the interbank market and/or banks are risk averse. Therefore a 
higher spread will measure higher funding liquidity risk. However this measure of 
funding liquidity risk can only be a proxy. This can happen because bidding 
behaviour may also be influenced by other factors. Ewerhart et al. for example 
consider a model with frictionless interbank markets where values for collateral used 
for OMOs and the secondary market differ. This in turn induces banks to submit bids 
which are higher than the marginal rate during the OMO. It is also shown that at year-
ends, banks engage in window-dressing, to establish favourable end of year balances 
(see Bindseil et al 2003). This should also hold for other reporting times. Clearly, 
these seasonality effects are unrelated to liquidity risk as they are driven by bank 
managers’ desire to signal a specific balance sheet to the market rather than by a 
reaction to funding pressures.  
On a more theoretical level, given a secondary market, bidding behaviour may also be 
influenced by the well-known “winner’s curse” problem: In single unit auction where 
bidders do not adjust their bid schedules, the bidder who is most optimistic about the 
value wins the auction and is therefore likely to overpay relative to the common value 
of the good (e.g. see Milgrom and Weber, 1982).
15 In anticipation of this, participants 
in the auction scale down their bid resulting in underbidding.  
Therefore, our measure could suffer from the “winner’s curse” problem. For this 
problem, however, to be material it is necessary that market participants have 
asymmetric information about the value of the good in the secondary market. Bindseil 
et al. (2008) test for this and find that there is no evidence that market participants in 
OMOs in the euro area have private information about (post auction) interest rates in 
the interbank market. Hence, the winner’s curse problem does not seem to be material 
for our set-up and should therefore not impact on our measure.  
4.3 Bidding with all sources of liquidity  
No model in the literature on bidding behaviour in OMOs takes into account all 
sources of funding liquidity shown in equation 2. In this section we briefly discuss the 
more general set-up using the stylised time line from above. In period 2 banks can 
therefore not only trade in the interbank market but also obtain liquidity from 
depositors or from selling assets. Both sources are considered in turn.  
                                                 
15 In a multi-unit set-up the winner’s curse problem is also referred to as champion’s plague (Ausubel, 
2004) 21
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In practice, a bank cannot expect to rely on new customer deposits to weather 
liquidity shocks in period 2. On the one hand, the literature has shown that deposits 
can act as a natural hedge against liquidity risk stemming from issuing loan 
commitments and lines of credit (e.g. see Kashyap et al 2002, or Gatev and Strahan, 
2006).
16  On the other hand, banks cannot rely on this, as they have a limited ability to 
actively attract new customer deposits in the short run (for example by raising rates) 
because of sluggish depositors’ behaviour (see Gondat-Larralde and Nier, 2004). 
Overall, both in- and outflows of customer deposits can therefore be seen as a random 
component from the banks’ risk management perspective. Essentially, they can be 
considered a liquidity shock within the discussed model framework, especially as we 
only measure liquidity risk over a one week horizon.  
Asset sales are an alternative source of liquidity in the short run. In line with our 
analysis for interbank lending, the availability of this source depends to a large extent 
on the existence of frictions in the markets. In a frictionless world, where the central 
bank distributes the correct amount of liquidity so that on aggregate no expected 
liquidity surpluses or deficits exist, any bank which does not have access to the 
primary market of liquidity can acquire the necessary liquidity in the secondary 
market (interbank market) or in asset markets. The costs of obtaining liquidity from 
either source are equal as all price differentials are arbitraged away in a frictionless 
world. Hence, in such an environment the results from Section 4.1 apply, and banks 
only bid at the policy rate as liquidity risk would be minimal.  
But frictions in asset as well as interbank markets are central in theories of liquidity 
risk For example, several models have shown that if asset markets are characterised 
by cash-in-the market pricing and there is an aggregate shortfall in liquidity, interbank 
market rates will be higher and asset prices will deviate from fundamentals, i.e. 
markets will be illiquid leading to distressed pricing (for an overview see Allen and 
Gale, 2007).   Distressed pricing can also be a result of further frictions in trading, 
borne by margin requirements (Brunnemeier and Pedersen, 2007), limits to arbitrage 
(Schleifer and Vischny, 1997) and predatory trading (Carlin, Lobo and Viswanathan, 
2007). Furthermore, frictions can lead to downward spirals between market and 
funding liquidity (see Gromb and Vayanos, 2002, or Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 
2007). Within our hypothetical time line, the latter models essentially consider an 
extended period 2 where falling asset prices interact with funding liquidity needs.  
                                                 
16 The rational for this is a flight to quality as banks have access to emergency liquidity from the central 
bank and depositors are sheltered from bank failures by the deposit insurance scheme. Pennachi (2006) 
shows that the negative correlation between deposit inflows and draw down of committed credit lines 
cannot be observed prior to the introduction of deposit insurance 22
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The inverse relationship between funding and market liquidity risk can be 
characterised as follows: A downward liquidity spiral can start with a bank (or brokers 
in the Brunnermeier and Pedersen model) which is short of liquidity and cannot obtain 
it from the interbank market. Therefore it has to sell assets. If asset markets are 
characterised by frictions, (large) asset sales induce a fall in asset prices. These in turn 
imply that the bank has to post higher margins, i.e. liquidity outflows increase. To 
remain liquid banks have to sell more assets, which depresses market prices even 
further (because of a lack of market liquidity), leading to further margin calls and so 
forth. The downward spiral can also start with falling asset prices.  
Overall, whatever the friction, a bank which expects to be short in period 2 and knows 
that the markets are characterised by frictions will anticipate that it has to pay higher 
prices to obtain the necessary liquidity from any available source. Hence, our results 
of Section 4.2 generalise, i.e. banks with higher liquidity risk will bid more 
aggressively in the open market operations. Therefore the spread can be used as a 
measure of funding liquidity risk.   
 
5.  Measuring funding liquidity risk
In Section 4 we have shown that a higher bid reveals higher funding liquidity risk. To 
measure funding liquidity risk empirically we normalise individual bank bids 
(consisting of the price and quantity submitted). We name these normalised bids 
“adjusted bids”. We define the adjusted bid (AB) of bank i at auction t as a normalised 
variable of the bid price times the bid volume for successful bids, that is   
 
t
t i b t i b
t i b allotment total
volume rate policy rate bid
AB
_
* ) _ _ ( , , , ,
, ,

     (4) 
where,  t i b rate bid , , _  is the price for liquidity,  t i b rate policy , , _  is the rate set at the 
Governing Council meeting the first Thursday of each month and equals the minimum 
bid rate and the (allotted)  t i b volume , ,  the bid volume of bank i, submitting from bid b 
(from 1 to B) at time (auction) t. We only consider successful bids, i.e. the prices for 
which the demanded volume was granted by the central bank, albeit rationed. The 
bids are normalised by the total allotment supplied by the central bank during auction 
t. The normalization of bids is necessary to remove changes in the monetary policy 
stance and ensure consistency across auctions which can differ in size. This will also 
ensure that our measure is unaffected by “frontloading” practices after August 2007 as 
discussed in Section 3. 23
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Based on the individual normalised bids we can construct an aggregate proxy of 
funding liquidity risk by summing across the adjusted bids of all banks. Following 
that reasoning, our first liquidity risk proxy (LRP) is simply the sum of all individual 
adjusted bids across banks for each auction.  
  ¦ ¦












where b (from b=1 to B) are the bids of each bank i (from i=1 to N ) for each time 
(auction) t.    
This proxy contains two categories of bidders: The ones who bid at the marginal rate 
and the ones who bid above the marginal. As discussed above without frictions and 
risk neutrality all banks should bid at the marginal rate. It is therefore not certain to 
what extent the first group of bidders paying a premium to acquire liquidity. 
Therefore we look at a second proxy for funding liquidity risk only capturing bids 
above the marginal rate.
  
Along the lines of equations 4 and 5 we replace the policy rate with the marginal rate. 
The adjusted bid over the marginal rate (AB_M) is 
 
t
t i b t i b
t i b allotment total
volume rate marginal rate bid
M AB
_
* ) _ _ (
_
, , , ,
, ,

      (6) 
and the measure LRP_M  measuring funding liquidity risk based on the bids over and 
above the marginal rate,  
    ¦  
i t i b t M AB M LRP , , _ _    (7) 
Chart A3.1 in Annex 3 provides a graphical representation of our two measures using 
one auction as an example. The two axes present the bid price (vertical) and the bid 
volumes (horizontal). LRP is nothing else than the normalised area under this demand 
curve (equal to area A plus area B divided by the total allotment). The figure also 
shows that LRP nests LRP_M (area A divided by the total allotment). Given our 
normalisation by the total allotment, it can be easily shown that the difference 
between the LRP and LRP_M equals the spread between the marginal rate (in the 
example 2.3%) and the policy rate which is also the minimum bid rate (in the example 
2.25%). 
Our two aggregate measures have an important practical advantage. Both can 
essentially be constructed using publicly available data as they collapse to the 
weighted average bid rate minus the policy rate (for LRP) or the marginal rate (for 24
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LRP_M).
17 The weighted average bid rate, the policy rate and the marginal rate are 
series reported by the ECB after each auction. Historical time series are also available 
from the ECB website.
18 In that sense, these measures are particularly useful for 
policymakers and market observers, who would want a quick and easy proxy to 
monitor funding liquidity risk conditions in the economy in real time.  In Annex 2, we 
present the main results of this paper (aggregate measures only) using publicly 
available data, as will be discussed in Section 7.3. 
Of course, having data on individual bid rates can be more interesting from a policy 
maker’s point of view. For example, it is possible to look at individual data in order to 
monitor bidding behavior of individual banks and hence their funding liquidity risk. 
Equally indeces for particular groups or even countries can be constructed. 
 
6. Data
Our analysis profits from a unique data set of 135 MROs conducted by the ECB from 
June 2005 to December 2007. ECB data for MRO auctions allow us to follow the 
bidding behaviour of each of the 877 banks that took part at least once over these 
years. Information includes an anonymous but unique code for each bidder, the 
submitted bid schedule (bid rate and bid volume) of each bank and the allotted 
volume. These data are not publicly available. However, data on the policy rate 
(minimum bid rate), the marginal rate, the weighted average rate and the maintenance 
periods and the settlement dates of the auctions are publicly available and taken from 
the ECB's internet site.  
Annex 3 provides an overview over the distribution of the individual bid rates, the 
spreads over the policy as well as the marginal rate and volumes. More specifically, 
Chart A3.2 displays the individual bid rates, as well as the policy and marginal rate, 
whereas Charts A3.3 and A3.4 present a more detailed graph of the two components 
(spreads and volumes) of the adjusted bids, as described in eq. 4 and 6. Each data 
point corresponds to a single dot in the graph. Therefore it is easy to have a first 
impression of the variability of the individual rates in each auction and the levels they 
tended to concentrate on. For example, it becomes clear that the turmoil period is 
associated with a larger variability in bid rates and more aggressive bidding, as 
                                                 
17 The weighted average bid rate (WABR) is calculated as the sum of the bid rate times the volume, 






t i b t i b
allotment total
allotted percentage volume rate bid
WABR
_
_ * * _
11
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      In our case, we use the allotted volumes, 
which is effectively equal to the volume*percentage_alloted.  
18 http://www.ecb.eu/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html 25
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suggested by the amount and extent of bids above the marginal rate (see Charts A3.2 
and A3.3). However, only a slight increase in the adjusted allotted volumes (i.e. the 
volumes allotted individually adjusted for the size of each auction) is noted over the 
whole period, with a single exception of a significant increase on the last MRO of 
2007.
19  
Annex 2 presents the results of the main analysis for an extended sample until 7 
October 2008. The evidence presented there is based entirely on publicly available 
data on the weighted average bid rate, the policy rate and the marginal rate, in order to 
indicate, as already suggested, that the construction of our aggregate measures can 
rely on publicly available data only. Nevertheless, it does not reach further than 
October 2008. This was the date of the last MRO before temporary changes to the 
auction design of the ECB were implemented. These changes involved switching 
from variable rate tender to fixed rate – full allotment tenders. They also included a 
symmetric narrowing of the ECB corridor from 100bps to 50 bps. Under the new 
framework only the volumes of liquidity demand are revealed but not the price, 
therefore one of the fundamental drivers of funding liquidity risk is shaded. As a 
result, our measure does not apply on the new auction design after October 2007.     
 
7. Results
7.1 Funding liquidity risk: Individual adjusted bids  
Chart 1 presents the adjusted bids (AB and AB_M) of each bank for every auction. In 
essence, the chart combines information in Charts A3.3 and A3.4 ( in Annex 3), 
which present the two individual components of the adjusted bids, following 
equations 4 and 6. Both panels in Chart 1 are scaled in the same way, in order to give 
a better impression of the relative size of each measure.   
In particular when looking at AB_M, it is obvious from Chart 1 that the last operation 
of the year is of particular intensity, the more so during the turmoil period, at the end 
of December 2007. End of year effects are well known by practitioners and in the 
literature. For example, Bindseil et al. (2003) argue that banks engage in window-
dressing to establish favourable end of year balances. As already mentioned in Section 
                                                 
19 On that particular date (28/12/2007) the number of bidders is significantly lower (only 118 compared 
to an average of 340 during the year, as other banks had already fulfilled their reserve requirements. 
The volumes of liquidity demanded by banks were broadly balanced with respect to the smaller size of 
the operation, but one particular banks demanded extraordinary high volumes for the standards of the 
specific operation resulting to almost one third of the total allotment. For the interested reader, the rates 
at which these volumes were requested were higher than the marginal rate.   26
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4, these seasonality effects are unrelated to liquidity risk. Therefore, we exclude 
auctions conducted at year ends in Chart 2. 
Chart 1: Distribution of adjusted bids (including year-ends) 
Note: The Chart presents adjusted bids including the last operation of each year. The upper chart, 
denoted AB, depicts individual adjusted bids where the spread is equal to the bid rate minus the policy 
rate. Equivalently, the lower chart denoted AB_M depicts individual adjusted bids where the spread is 
equal to the bid rate minus the marginal rate. 
Chart 2: Distribution of adjusted bids (excluding year-ends) 
 
Note: The Chart presents adjusted bids excluding the last operation of each year. The upper chart, 
denoted LRP, depicts individual adjusted bids where the spread is equal to the bid rate minus the policy 27
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rate. Equivalently, the lower chart denoted LRP_M depicts individual adjusted bids where the spread is 
equal to the bid rate minus the marginal rate. 
When we exclude end-of-year operations, an increased pressure during the turmoil 
period becomes apparent. This is especially the case for the adjusted bids over the 
policy rate (upper chart in Chart 2), where the dispersion of the adjusted bids 
increases significantly after August 2007. To a lesser extent the increase in the 
dispersion is also evident in AB_M (lower chart in Chart 2).  
However the reader should keep in mind that the graphs do not clear reveal funding 
liquidity pressures in the same way as the Charts of the aggregate data do. Even 
though individual bids are presented as a dot in the graph, these merge into a line in 
particular for low values of AB and AB_M given a lack of granularity. The same 
charts but with different scales are presented also in Annex 3 (Charts A3.5). There it 
becomes clearer that both measures display similar increases during the turmoil 
period. This means that it is aggressive bidding over the marginal rate which mostly 
drives the results of that period. Nevertheless, it is more informative to look at the 
aggregate measures. 
7.2 Aggregate funding liquidity risk measures 
Our aggregate measure of funding liquidity risk is presented in Chart 3 summarising 
the information of Chart 1 and 2 into one measure according to equations 5 and 7. 
Given the previous discussion, we exclude end-of year effects
20, which are however 
included in Chart A3.6 in the Annex. Chart 3 clearly suggests that funding liquidity 
risk is time varying and persistent, but subject to occasional spikes. These properties 
bode well with measures for market liquidity (Amihud, 2002; Chordia et al., 2000, 
2002; Pastor and Staumbaugh, 2003; Brunnemeier and Pedersen, 2007).   
The time series of our liquidity risk measures LRP and LRP_M reveal that liquidity 
risk climbs to higher levels towards the end of the sample. Most practitioners would 
certainly agree that these months have witnessed the most pronounced events in terms 
of funding liquidity in our sample. For the LRP measure this change in level coincides 
perfectly with the beginning of the turmoil in August 2007. Since then, the measure 
increased significantly as we observe the reaction of the banking system to the credit 
market turmoil. After the initial reaction in August, a peak was reached in September, 
when Northern Rock had to be rescued by the UK government. After a short lived 
fall, LRP rose again as tensions continued in interbank markets up to the end of 2007. 
                                                 
20 This is essentially equivalent to running a regression of the measure LRP on three dummy variables 
for each year end. 28
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Table 1 provides the summary statistics for this data. It is apparent that both LRP and 
LRP_M increase during the turmoil following 9 August 2007. In fact, both measures 
more than double on average. The increase in volatility is also enormous, especially 
for LRP which increases more than ten-fold.  












Note: The chart presents the LRP and LRP_M measures excluding the last operation of each year. The 
light blue horizontal line indicates the beginning of the turmoil (here 14 August when the first MRO 
was undertaken after the turmoil started). Green dots indicate starting dates of new maintenance 
periods.  
Table 1: Statistics (excluding year-ends) 
LRP LRP_1
Turmoil Normal Ratio Turmoil Normal Ratio
mean 0.167 0.064 2.59 0.021 0.009 2.34
variance 0.00234 0.00021 11.07 0.00012 0.00003 3.65
min 0.090 0.025 3.63 0.001 0.0001 3.79
max 0.294 0.107 2.74 0.041 0.032 1.30  
Note: Normal indicates the period from June 2005 until 7 August 2007. Turmoil is the remaining 
period until December 2007. Ratio equals Turmoil/Normal. 
 
With the beginning of the turmoil a wedge between LRP and LRP_M appears 
(consistent with the evidence on Chart 1 and 2). This suggests that banks on average 
faced significant funding pressures which lead to a higher dispersion in their bid rates 29
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(see Chart A3.2 in Annex 3) and a rise in the marginal rate. Therefore, the spread 
between the marginal rate and the policy rate also increased (see Chart A3.2 and A3.8 
in Annex 3).   
Nevertheless, at the end of the sample period, both measures rise significantly.  This 
was combined with a steep rise of the marginal rate (see Chart A3.8, in Annex 3). The 
means that in the second half of September and early October funding liquidity risk 
was perceived so high, that there were banks submitting bids at extremely high prices, 
although all banks were bidding more aggressively, (therefore raising the marginal 
rate), In fact some banks just a bid only marginally lower than the marginal lending 
facility rate.  
Another issue worth of attention is the several peaks prior to the turmoil in LRP_M, 
which are nearly as high as during the early stages of the turmoil period. This can 
partly be explained. Most of these spikes occur at dates when the marginal rate was 
equal or very close to the policy rate and all bidding banks were more or less satisfied. 
As a result, the area captured by the two measures was approximately the same, which 
is why we observe a drop in LRP for the same dates.  
Overall, looking at both LRP measures it is possible to get complementary 
information on the bidding behaviour that drives the final results. Overall LRP 
captures increased aggressiveness in bidding. LRP_M, which is included in LRP, 
mirrors the effect of certain extraordinary high bids. In essence LRP_M can be seen as 
the peek of LRP, over and above the marginal rate. Consequently, comparing the 
difference between the two, it is possible to get an idea about how far the marginal 
rate lies from the minimum bid rate. It becomes clear that during the turmoil period, 
there was an overall increase in funding liquidity risk, which manifested itself in 
increased bidding aggressiveness, creating the apparent wedge between the LRP and 
the LRP_M measure.  Therefore, LRP_M is a complementary indicator of aggregate 
funding liquidity risk in the market.   
Finally, a closer inspection of Chart 3 also reveals that spikes in LRP_M prior to the 
turmoil are generally associated with the end of maintenance periods (green dots 
indicate the start of a new maintenance period). This is normal given that at the last 
operation of the maintenance period the bidding is more aggressive because the need 
to fulfil the reserve requirements becomes binding.  
It is worth noting that the same analysis has been undertaken with an extended data 
set using only publicly available information. Annex 2 presents Table A2.1 and Chart  
A2.1, which are effectively updated versions of Table 1 and Chart 3. There it is 
possible to see the development of our aggregate measures during 2008 before the 
allocation mechanism for MROs was temporarily chagned in October. The analysis 30
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shows that liquidity conditons for banks were even worse in 2008 than in 2007, in 
particular after the Lehmann Brothers collapse in September 2008, where funding 
liquidity risk reached unforeseen levels. 
 
7.3 Funding liquidity risk and market liquidity 
In section 4.3 we have discussed that market and funding liquidity are strongly 
interrelated. Once there are frictions and banks are constrained, downward spirals of 
falling asset prices and higher funding liquidity risk can emerge. Whilst the theoretical 
expositions are clear and many observers attribute the recent turmoil to these 
interactions, it has not been shown empirically due to a lack of measures for funding 
liquidity risk. Using our measure we are able to empirically support these interactions 
by looking at the interrelationships between our measure LRP and an index of market 
liquidity used by the ECB Financial Stability Review in June 2008 (see ECB, 2008) 
(see Chart A3.9 Annex 3 for a time series). This index is a weighted average of 
different market liquidity measures such as bid-ask spreads in FX, equity, bond and 
money markets.  
Chart 4 shows a scatter plot of LRP and the ECB market liquidity index. A clear 
negative relationship can be seen, i.e. when market liquidity is drying up (i.e. is low), 
funding liquidity risk is high (which would be equivalent to saying that high funding 
liquidity risk is associated with high market liquidity risk). The red line shows the 
predicted values based on a simple regression of the index on LRP. These results are 
shown in Table 2. The scatter plot already suggests that the negative relationship is 
primarily driven by the turmoil. The econometric analysis supports this as there is no 
significant relationship between our measure of funding liquidity risk and market 
liquidity prior to the turmoil.
21 However, once the turmoil unfolds a significant 
negative relationship emerges. This is exactly what the theory predicts as these 
interactions should only emerge once banks become funding constraint. Therefore this 
analysis strongly supports the current theoretical insights. 
                                                 
21 Similar results emerge when undertaking the same analysis with LRP_M and the spread between the 
marginal and policy rate. Interestingly, the R-squared is highest for LRP (.76) and lowest for LRP_M 
(.26) whilst the regression with the spread between the marginal and policy rate has an explanatory 
power of .66 (R-squared is given for the regression using the full sample).  31
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Note: Normal indicates the period from June 2005 until 7 August 2007. Turmoil is the remaining 
period until December 2007. Fitted values are based on the regression using the whole sample.  
Table 2: Regression results of market liquidity index on LRP 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  p-value  R-squared 
Full sample        
Market liquidity   -0.077  0.004  -18.620  0.727 
constant 0.101  0.002  44.490   
        
Normal        
Market liquidity   -0.003  0.018  -0.170  0.003 
constant 0.066  0.008  7.780   
        
Turmoil      
Market liquidity   -0.047  0.018  -2.670  0.295 
constant 0.133  0.016  8.310   
Normal indicates the period from June 2005 until 7 August 2007. Turmoil is the remaining period until 
December 2007. 
Annex 2 presents an updated version of these results until October 2008, using 
publicly available information. The results are presented in Chart A2.2 and Table 
A2.2. This extended time series analysis strengthens our results on the interaction 
between market and funding liquidity risk. 32
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In this paper we propose definitions of funding liquidity and funding liquidity risk and 
present a simple, yet intuitive measure of funding liquidity risk, based on information 
from the liquidity providing operations of the central bank. We define funding 
liquidity as the ability to settle obligations with immediacy. Accordingly, funding 
liquidity risk is driven by the possibility that over a specific horizon the bank will 
become unable to settle obligations with immediacy. We show that funding liquidity 
risk has two components: future (random) in- and outflows of money and future 
(random) prices of obtaining funding liquidity from different sources. Given banks 
anticipate prices for liquidity in interbank and asset markets, we can show that higher 
funding liquidity risk in turn leads to higher bids during open market operations 
conducted by the central bank.    
Using information from a data set of 135 main refinancing operations conducted by 
the ECB from June 2005 to December 2007, we construct two measures of funding 
liquidity risk, which aim to take into account the (normalised) information of both the 
price and the quantity of the liquidity demanded. Unsurprisingly, we find that the 
resulting measures record spikes after August 2007, indicating the presence of 
increased funding liquidity risk as would have been expected. We also find that our 
measures bear resemblances with market liquidity and have properties such as low 
levels, persistence and occasional spikes, which the literature has already identified. 
Finally we are able to find evidence that there is indeed an inverse relationship 
between funding liquidity risk and market liquidity risk.   
Our two aggregate measures have an important practical advantage. Both can 
essentially be constructed using publicly available data as they, on aggregate, collapse 
to the weighted average bid rate minus the policy rate (for LRP) or the marginal rate 
(for LRP_M). And the weighted average bid rate, the policy rate and the marginal rate 
are series reported by the ECB after each auction. In that sense, these measures are 
particularly interesting to policymakers and market observers, who would want a 
quick and easy proxy to monitor funding liquidity risk conditions in the economy in 
real time.  
Our analysis is only a starting point in using bidding data to assess funding liquidity 
risk. It would certainly be interesting to implement our measure for different 
jurisdictions, such as the United States. There the provision of central bank money is 
significantly different. Daily OMOs are only conducted with a narrow set of broker 
dealers, who rely on settlement banks to settle all their transactions (hence they 
generally settle in commercial bank money). More in line with the auctions described 
8. Conclusion 33
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above which should are the newly introduced Term Auction Facility.
22 Here banks 
can bid directly for central bank money with the maturity of one month. Even though 
the auction is conducted as a single-price auction format it should be possible to use 
bids as a measure for funding liquidity risk based on our approach. 
Overall, this paper introduces the idea that a proxy for funding liquidity risk can be 
constructed from bidding data in the central bank auctions. An empirical proxy for 
funding liquidity risk was missing up to now in the literature. So far, it was thought 
that such a measure would require a large data set using private information from 
banks. However, given equilibrium relationships banks’ bids during open market 
operations will reflect funding liquidity risk. Our idea therefore simplifies matters 
considerably and allows us to construct for the first time a proxy for funding liquidity 
risk. We are therefore able to provide, for the first time, empirical evidence that 
funding liquidity risk has similar properties as market liquidity and that funding 
liquidity co-moves with market liquidity, as suggested by the relevant literature. In 
that sense our paper provides a useful contribution to the liquidity literature not only 
because it opens up ways of further empirical research on liquidity, an area of 
research hindered by the unavailability of proxies, but also because it can be used as a 
very efficient tool for policy analysis and monitoring.   
                                                 
22 For further details see http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/taf.htm.  34
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Annex 1: Funding liquidity and the role of central bank money  
In this Annex we provide a more granular view of the key components of the funding 
liquidity constraint and explain the role of central bank in greater depth. In section 2 
we argued that a funding liquidity constraint can be represented by  
 
  Outflowst    Inflowst  + Stock of Moneyt   (1) 
Table A1.1: Components and sources of in- and outflows of money 
 Outflow  Inflow 












due A LI L    












due A LI L    
Asset market  sold A   bought A  
Off-balance sheet items  out OB   in OB  










new CB CB   
    
Where: 
x L/A are liabilities and assets of the bank;
23 
x LI/AI/CBI are interest payments paid or received by the bank;  
x IB/D stands for interbank and other depositors (or borrowers); 
x due stands for assets and liabilities which are contractually due in the period;  
x new stands for assets and liabilities newly issued; new can also include liabilities or assets 
which are rolled over;  
x OB are off-balance sheet items which can contribute to out- or inflows; 
x Assets can also be sold/bought on the secondary market; 
x CB
MRO are central bank balances obtained from the weekly main refinancing operations; 
x CB
other are in- and outflows of central bank balances obtained directly from the central bank 
but not in the weekly refinancing operations, for example by accessing the marginal lending or 
deposit facility or participating in fine tuning operations.
24  
 
Note: Liquidity will also be determined by other cash flows which can be inflows such as fees and 
commissions or new equity capital, or outflows such as costs or dividend payments. 
Table A1.1 provides an overview of key components of in- and outflows and 
attributes them to the five main funding sources. Note that in order to keep sub-
indices to a minimum, t was dropped in Table A1.1. The reader should keep in mind 
that time plays an important role for funding liquidity. For liquidity risk management 
purposes, banks also have to distinguish between different currencies the bank is 
                                                 
23 These include assets and liabilities in both the banking and trading book.  
24 In the Eurosystem reserves are also remunerated which constitute are part of 
other
in CB .  38
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active in. The stock flow constraint has to hold in each currency but as long as foreign 
exchange markets are functioning, (funding) liquidity can be transferred. We therefore 
ignore currency differences in our analysis. The analysis of the stock flow constraint 
and its components gets also more complicated if the banking system is tiered and 
some small banks use corresponded banks to participate in the settle and payment 
system or the central bank auctions. Even though tiering is not uncommon in banking 
systems, we do not take account of this in our discussion below, but instead focus on 
the main systemically important banks which also participate in the auctions.  
The first source of inflows and outflows is driven by behaviour of depositors.  A bank 
receives an inflow of money if borrowers pay back their loan and/or interest 
(Adue+AIdue) or by receiving new deposits (Lnew). Similarly, outflows can be a result of 
depositors withdrawing money (Ldue), the bank paying interest (LIdue) or the bank 
issuing new loans (Anew).  Note that not all withdrawals of depositors have to 
necessarily lead to a change in central bank balances. A large bank can settle a lot of 
transactions on its own book. If for example consumer A pays company Y and both 
have an account at the same bank this transaction gets settled in the bank’s own 
money. If however company Y has an account with another bank, the transfer 
between the banks is ultimately settled in central bank money. Even though it may be 
the case that, depending on the settlement system, only net transfers between both 
banks at the end of the day are settled in central bank money (CPSS, 2003) 
The second source is different from the first one only insofar as we distinguish 
between interbank markets and other depositors/borrowers. Distinguishing is 
important because the behaviour of interbank markets and other depositors is 
significantly different. The latter are generally very sluggish to react and do not 
monitor banks very well (see Gondat- Larralde and Nier, 2004). A further important 
difference between depositors and the interbank market is that all transfers between 
large banks are settled in central bank money. In the euro area these transfers take 
place in TARGET2
25 which is a real time gross settlement system (RTGS), i.e. 
payments are settled continuously and in gross rather than net amounts.  
Whether in- and outflows are secured or not does not matter for the flow analysis. 
Therefore, repo transactions are also contained in the interbank flows. However, 
depending on the legal structure, repos can also be asset sales/purchases with a 
binding agreement to reverse the trade in the future. Asset sales/purchases are the 
third component in the stock flow constraint. For the conceptual analysis it is not 
important to distinguish asset sales/purchases from the trading book from those of the 
banking book. However, practically they differ as equity and bonds held in the trading 
                                                 
25 TARGET2 became operational in November 2007 and replaced the previous TARGET system. 39
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1024
March 2009
book can often be traded on organised exchanges in relatively liquid markets (in the 
sense of market liquidity).
26 Whilst assets held in the banking book are sold and 
purchased for example via securitisation programmes “over the counter”. This 
requires more time and effort and markets tend to be less liquid, especially during 
times of stress as could be observed recently (ECB, 2007). Practically, asset sales 
from the trading and banking book also differ how they are settled. Whilst many over 
the counter transactions are settled in the payment system and hence involve central 
money, the interaction of central bank money and securities settlement systems is 
more complex. A survey by the ECB (2004) highlights the range of practices in the 
euro area. Settlement can be effectively real time as in Crest in the UK or there can be 
settlement cycles such as the overnight cycle use by Monte Titoli (Italy) where central 
bank money is only involved to settle net amounts. Nonetheless, central bank money 
to achieve finality in the settlement of at least net-transfers always plays an important 
role.  
The fourth source is cash in- and outflows from off-balance sheet activities. An 
important part of liquidity demands from off balance sheet items (OBout)  are 
committed credit lines to companies or off-balance sheet vehicles such as conduits 
(see IIF, 2007, BIS, 2006). Essentially, are drawn credit line is a new obligation for 
the bank. In that sense they could be included in Lnew. However, for expositional 
purposes we present them in a separate group as they proved to be a key transmission 
channel from liquidity problems in the structured credit to the interbank market during 
the recent turmoil (see ECB, 2007). In addition, margin calls, which are also part of 
OBout,  can have a significant impact on cash flows. However, as part of their 
contingency preparation, banks themselves generally have contingent liquidity lines 
with other banks (OBin).  
The last source of the stock flow constraint is for our empirical analysis the most 
important one as banks can obtain new central bank money from the central bank 
directly. These are also important from a system perspective as all transactions 
discussed so far do not change the amount of central bank money but represent a 
transfer from bank A to bank B. Only direct interactions can change the aggregate 
amount of central bank money in the economy.  
Given our empirical measure we distinguish MROs and other interactions with the 
central bank. MROs are based on repo-arrangements and have a maturity of one week. 
Hence, new borrowing (
MRO
in CB ) can only be obtained against collateral but the 
transaction is reversed at the end of the maturity. At this point the bank faces an 
                                                 
26 Depending on the settlement system, securities settlement generally involves central bank money, 
especially in the euro area (see ECB, 2004) again indicating the crucial role for central bank money in 
the economy. 40
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due CBI CB  ). In- and outflows of central bank money (
other
in CB or 
other
out CB ) are 
also generated when banks access the marginal lending or deposit facility (also 
referred to as the discount window) or if banks participate in fine tuning operations or 
long term refinancing operations. In the Eurosystem reserves are also remunerated 
which constitutes another type of inflows of central bank money. In an extreme case, 





Annex 2: Update Charts and Tables 
This annex presents Charts 2 and 3 and Tables 1 and 2 with updated information up 
until October 2008. The data presented in this section are based entirely on publicly 
available information as suggested in Section 4 (see also footnote 19) and the 
conclusion. Of course, only aggregated data are presented, as data for the individual 
adjusted bids, the bid rates and the volumes are not available. Two main issues can be 
extracted from the updated data:  
First, the intensification of funding liquidity risk during 2008 continued and assumed 
dramatic levels after the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008.   
Second, the negative relationship between funding and market liquidity risk appears 
even stronger. The results are even more robust, given the extended data sample.  
Table A2.1: Statistics (excluding year ends) 
 LRP       LRP1LRP_M   
Normal Turmoil Ratio    Normal Turmoil  Ratio 
Mean 0.066 0.213 3.216  0.011 0.048  4.365 
Variance 0.020 0.118 5.815  0.018 0.056  3.156 
min 0.025 0.090 3.625  0.000 0.001  3.795 
max 0.179 0.740 4.124  0.166 0.310  1.866 
Obs 114 60 0.526   114 60  0.526 
Note: Normal indicates the period from June 2005 until 7 August 2007. Turmoil is the remaining 
period until December 2007. Fitted values are based on the regression using the whole sample 
 
 
                                                 
27 Banks’ direct access to central bank money differs significantly across jurisdictions as has been 
shown in the short discussion in Section 7 about differences in the US and Europe. Collateral accepted 
is also different for different countries. In many countries such as the US accessing the marginal 
facilities is also associated with a stigma and may have reputational repercussions for the bank. Stigma 
is the euro area is less pronounced.  41
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Note: The Chart presents the LRP and LRP_M measures including the last operation of each year.  
 
 










































Note: Normal indicates the period from June 2005 until 7 August 2007. Turmoil is the remaining 
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Table A2.2: Regression results of market liquidity index on LRP 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error  p-value  R-squared 
Full sample        
Market liquidity   -0.112  0.006  -18.140  0.727 
constant 0.115  0.004  25.820   
        
Normal         
Market liquidity   -0.003  0.018  -0.170  0.003 
constant 0.066  0.008  7.780   
        
Turmoil        
Market liquidity   -0.121  0.022  -5.440  0.295 
constant 0.106  0.023  4.540   
Normal indicates the period from June 2005 until 7 August 2007. Turmoil is the remaining period until 




Annex 3: Additional Charts 










Working Paper Series No 1024
March 2009
Chart A3.2: Bid rates in ECB MRO auctions 
 
Note: The chart presents the individual bid rates of all banks participating in the ECB MROs from June 
2005 until December 2007. It also presents the unique policy rate and marginal rate for each auction.   
Chart A3.3: Bid spreads in ECB MRO auctions 
Note: The chart presents the individual bid spread of all banks participating in the ECB MROs from 
June 2005 until December 2007. The spread from the policy (marginal) rate is measures by the 
difference between the bid rate and the policy (marginal) rate.44
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Chart A3.4: Adjusted volumes in ECB MRO auctions 
 
Note: The Chart presents the adjusted bid volumes of all banks participating in the ECB MROs from 
June 2005 until December 2007. The adjusted volume is measured as the individual allotted volume 
divided by the sum allotted volumes in the respective auction. For each auction it also present the 
maximum value for the adjusted volume measure.  
Chart A3.5: Distribution of adjusted bids (including year-ends) 
Note: The Chart presents adjusted bids including the last operation of each year. The upper chart, 
denoted AB, depicts individual adjusted bids where the spread is equal to the bid rate minus the policy 
rate. Equivalently, the lower chart denoted AB_M depicts individual adjusted bids where the spread is 
equal to the bid rate minus the marginal rate. 45
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Chart A3.6: Distribution of adjusted bids (excluding year-ends) 
 
Note: The Chart presents adjusted bids excluding the last operation of each year. The upper chart, 
denoted AB, depicts individual adjusted bids where the spread is equal to the bid rate minus the policy 
rate. Equivalently, the lower chart denoted AB_M depicts individual adjusted bids where the spread is 
equal to the bid rate minus the marginal rate. 













Note: The Chart presents the LRP and LRP_M measures including the last operation of each year. 46
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Note: The Chart presents the policy rate and marginal on left hand axis (in %). The spread is the 
difference between the marginal rate and the policy rate (right hand axis, in %) 
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Note: For further information see Chart 3.1 ECB (2008) 47
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